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CONSERVATION OR COERCION: FEDERAL REGULATION OF INTRASTATEWETLANDS
UNDER THE SWAMBUSTER PROVISIONS OF THE FOOD SECURITY ACT
United States v. Dierckman'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Food Security Act ("FSA"), enacted by Congress in 1985, included a "Swampbuster" provision that made
any individual who converted a wetland and grew crops on the land after December 23, 1985 ineligible for USDA farm
benefits.2 In 1990, Congress passed the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act ("FACTA"), which strengthened
the original provision by adding a provision which provided that any individual who converted a wetlalnd with the purpose
of making it suitable for agricultural production after November 28, 1990 would be ineligible for USDA farm benefits.
Following the 1990 amendments, an individual could become ineligible for USDA benefits by either converting wetlands
and growing crops on the land after December 23, 1985, or by simply converting wetlands after November 28, 1990.4 In
United States v. Dierckman, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Swampbuster
provisions of the FSA, as amended by the FACTA, are a valid exercise of Congress' spending power. By so
characterizing the Swampbuster provisions, the court greatly expanded the power of the federal government to regulate
wholly intrastate wetlands. The court also endorsed a coercive federal regulatory scheme under which Congress may,
through the guise of its spending power, indirectly regulate use of private property that it is unable to regulate under its
constitutionally enumerated powers.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1993, the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") declared Jerry Dierckman5 ineligible for all
USDA farm benefit programs, retroactive to the 1991 crop year, based on alleged violations of the "Swampbuster"'
provisions of the Food Security Act ("FSA") of 1985, as amended by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act
("FACTA") of 1990.' The United States sued to recover $92,703.00 in farm benefits paid to Jerry Dierckman in the crop
years 1991, 1992, and 1993.8
A. Swanpbuster Provision Background Facts
The Food Security Act ("FSA"), enacted by Congress in 1985, included a "Swampbuster" provision that made
any individual who converted a wetland and grew crops on the land after December 23, 1985 ineligible for USDA farm
benefit programs.9 In 1990, Congress added even more stringent requirements to Swampbuster in the Food, Agriculture,
Conservation, and Trade Act ("FACTA").o The amendments implemented by FACTA retained the original 1985
provision" and added a new provision stating that any person who converted a wetland for the purpose of making
201 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2000).
Pub. L. No. 99-198, tit. XII, § 1221, 99 Stat. 1507 (1985); 16 U.S.C. § 3821 (1986). Such benefits include price supports or payments. loans. crop
insurance, or disaster payments related to agricultural production.
Pub. L. 101-624, tit. XIV, § 1421(b), 104 Stat. 3572 (1990). The original provision is currently codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3821 (a) (1994). and the
provision added by FACTA is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3821 (c) (1994).
4 201 F.3d at 918.
Following the lead of the 7th Circuit in the instant decision, this note will refer to Jerry Dierckman as "Jerry." to avoid confusion because Jerry's
father, Milton Dierckman is also substantially involved in the events underlying the case. Milton Dierckman will herein be referred to as "Milton."
6 "Swampbuster" is the common name of Title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985.
United States v. Diercluman. 201 F.3d 915. 917 (7th Cir. 2000).
8 Id.
9 See supra note 2.
0 16 U.S.C. § 3801 (1994).
1 See supra note 3.
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agricultural production possible would be ineligible for USDA farm benefits.' 2 Thus, following the 1990 amendments, an
individual could become ineligible for USDA farm benefits by either converting wetlands and growing crops on the land
after December 23, 1985, or by converting wetlands such as to make agricultural production possible after November 28,
1990.'3
Under the Swampbuster provisions, the two agencies within the USDA that are charged with making ineligibility
determinations are the Soil Conservation Service ("SCS") and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Agency
("ASCS")." The SCS determines whether a wetland or converted wetland exists on a farm and whether production of
crops is possible on any converted wetlands." The determination by the SCS is initially made by a district
conservationist, whose decision is appealable to an area conservationist, then to the state conservationist, and finally to the
Chief of the SCS in Washington, D.C."
After the SCS determines the existence or conversion of a wetland on a farm, the ASCS determines if any
exemptions" apply to the conversion of the particular wetland, and then determines the eligibility of a farmer who applies
for USDA benefits." The initial eligibility decision is made by an ASCS county committee, which can be appealed to the
ASCS state committee, then to the Deputy Administrator for State and County Operations ("DASCO") and lastly, to the
National Appeals Division ("NAD") of the ASCS.'9
B. Facts Surrounding the Dierckman Determination
Jerry Dierckman was a farmer who grew crops on both his own land and land he rented from others, including
land rented from his father, Milton Dierckman.2 ' The land at issue in United States v. Dierckman was property Jerry
rented from his father located in Franklin County, Indiana.2' In 1986, MiLton cut down the trees on approximately two-
thirds of the northeastern portion of the property in question." Milton Feft the stumps in the ground fora number of years
thereafter, leaving the portion of the property at issue unsuitable for farming 3 In August of 1990, Jerry hired Gunter
Excavating Company ("Gunter") to dig up the stumps, remove themn, and fill the holes.24 On September 3, 1990, Gunter
issued a proposal to Jerry concerning the work-' Gunter began work shortly thereafter and sent Jerry a bill for the work
on September 25, 1990-.2 The bill indicated "work ordered" by Jerry, but Milton paid the bill on October 10, 1990.27 Due
to heavy rains in October, Gunter was unable to finish the work and for the next several months, the land remained
unchanged, with only some of the stumps removed and some of the holes left unfilled.
On January 7, 1991, Jerry filled out ASCS form AD- 1026 ("Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation
Certification") in order to have his eligibility to receive USDA farm benefits for the 1991 crop year certified by the
ASCS.29 On this form, Jerry indicated that he intended to convert "wet areas" and grow crops on those areas of his farm.30
12 The relevant portions of the section state that "any person who in any crop year beginning after November 28. 1990, converts a wetland by
draining. dredging. filling, leveling. or any other means for the purpose or to have the effect, of making the production of an agricultural commodity
possible on such converted wetland shall be ineligible for" USDA farm benefits. 16 U.S.C. § 3821 (c) (1986).
' 201 F.3d at 918.
" The SCS has been abolished and its functions transferred to the Natural Resources Conservation Service. See 7 U.S.C. § 6962 (1994).
Likewise. the ASCS has been replaced by the Farm Service Agency. See 7 U.S.C. § 6932 (1994) (replacing ASCS with the Consolidated Farm
Service Agency ("CFSA')): 60 Fed. Reg. 56.392 (Nov. 8. 1995) (renaming the CFSA as the Farm Service Agency). However, both the SCS and
ASCS were operative at all times relevant to the instant decision and the agencies are herein referred to as the SCS and ASCS.
" 201 F.3d at 918. See 7 C.F.R. § 12.6(c).
16 Id.
1 See 16 U.S.C. § 3822 (1994).
's 201 F.3d at 918. See 7 C.F.R. § 12.6(a)(b).
'9 Id.
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The ASCS then referred the matter to SCS to determine if the Swampbuster provisions of the FSA protected any of the
wetlands indicated." In March of 1991, an SCS district conservationist determined that Jerry's farm contained both
wetlands and converted wetlands. They, however, determined that the more stringent provisions of the FACTA
amendments did not cover the converted wetlands because the conversion had ended before the FACTA amendments took
effect on November 28, 1990.32 Therefore, Jerry was not in violation of Swampbuster because no crops had been grown
on the converted wetlands.33 The district conservationist did inform Jerry, however, that any further conversion would be
a Swampbuster violation regardless of whether crops were grown.34
Jerry then filed another Form AD-1026, indicating that he had no intention to convert wet areas on the land, but
on March 19, 1991, he appealed to the area conservationist requesting a redetermination and permission to continue
clearing the land. In May 1991, the area conservationist denied the appeal, and in July of 1991, the state conservationist
affirmed the determination of the area conservationist.36 In September 1991, the Chief of the SCS affirmed the
determinations of the area and state conservationists.37 The Chief found that because the wetlands were converted before
November 28, 1990 and no crops had been grown, no Swampbuster violation existed, but any future conversion would
result in USDA ineligibility."
On December 18, 1991, the district conservationist inspected the part of Jerry's farm designated as wetlands and
found that additional stumps had been removed and that the land appeared to be farmable. 39 The district conservationist
then denoted a Swampbuster violation and notified Jerry by letter in January 1992." Jerry responded by phone, claiming
that he had "no control" over the land, and that his father, Milton Dierckman, owned the property in question and that
Milton intended to continue converting the land.'
Jerry met with SCS officials at the farm in July 1992, where SCS officials determined that further conversion had
taken place.42 Both Jerry and his mother, who was also present at the meeting, explained that Milton, as the owner of the
property, had done the conversion. 3 The SCS agent inquired whether Jerry had discussed with the ASCS the possibility
of reconstituting the property so as to make the records show Jerry as the operator of the cropland only and Milton as the
operator of the wetlands." Jerry responded by saying that he had no dealings with the ASCS."
After the district conservationist had determined that the fact that the wetlands had been converted after
November 28, 1990 constituted a violation of Swampbuster, Jerry appealed to the area conservationist. 6 The area
conservationist rejected the appeal in July of 1992, and the state conservationist then affirmed the determination of the
district conservationist. In September 1992, the SCS sent Jerry a letter urging him to contact the local ASCS office
concerning the status of his USDA farm benefits as operator of the farm. In October 1993, the Acting Chief of the SCA
rejected Jerry's appeal.






3s Id. at 919-20.









45 Id. The agent's notes indicate that the agent was informed by the ASCS office in Jennings County. IN. that the farm could indeed be reconstituted
to show Jerry as the operator of the cropland only. but instead of pursuing this option. Jerry continued to claim to be the "-operator" of the farm. filing
another AD-1026 with the ASCS for the crop year 1992. indicating that he had converted or would convert wetland into farmable land. Id. n. 8.
46 Id. at 920-21.
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stating that SCS determinations were complete and that Jerry had in fact converted wetlands after November 28, 1990.o
On November 17, 1993, the county ASCS committee found that both Jerry and Milton were responsible for the
conversion and declared them ineligible for USDA benefits for all land they owned and operated." Jerry then appealed to
the state ASCS committee, which found that Jerry had no control over Milton's decision to convert the land.52 The state
ASCS committee asked the county committee to grant Jerry's requested relief, but the county committee refused to
reverse. 3 The Deputy Administrator for State and County Operations found Jerry ineligible for benefits because evidence
existed that Jerry was in general control of the operation on the converted wetlands.54 Jerry then appealed to the National
Appeals Division ("NAD") of the ASCS." The NAD denied his appeal in January 1995, finding Jerry ineligible for
benefits for the crop years 1991, 1992, and 1993.6 The United States then instituted the present suit in Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana to recover $92,703.00 in USDA benefit payments made to Jerry in the 1991,
1992, and 1993 crop years.
Jerry argued that the wetland at issue was outside of the reach of the FSA, as it had no connection to interstate
commerce." Jerry also challenged the ineligibility determination, arguing that the agency decision was not supported by
evidence. 9 Jerry argued that it was his father, and not he, who was the "operator" of the wetlands.o Jerry argued that the
ineligibility determination was incorrect because the USDA regulation mandating his ineligibility, 7 C.F.R. § 12.4(e),"
was void due to its inconsistency with the FSA.62 Jerry specifically argued that this provision extended liability to a farm
"operator" who has played no role in wetlands conversion and that the plain language of Swampbuster itself prohibited
this extension. Jerry asserted that the person who converts the wetland must be the person who physically brings about
the conversion, and that an "operator" of the land should not be charged with the actions of the owner because the owner
has "ultimate" control over the land. Jerry lastly contended that the FSA and its implementing regulations violated
substantive due process.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the District Court entered summary judgment in favor
of plaintiff United States." The District Court held that the wetland at issue was subject to Swampbuster, even if it did not
affect interstate commerce, as the act was a function of Congress' spending power. The court further held that the
administrative finding that Jerry was the "operator" of the wetlands in question was supported by evidence, and that 7
C.F.R. §12.4(e), the regulation defining a "person converting wetlands" as an "owner or operator" of land, was a
reasonable and consistent interpretation of the statute. 6. The District Court also held that the Swampbuster provision and
5' Id. Jerry then moved for reconsideration on the basis that he was not the operator of the converted wetlands and that any work on the converted
lands by him was completed prior to November 28. 1990. In January of 1994. the county committee rejected this motion. finding that Jerry was the










61 [A] person shall be determined to have produced an agricultural commodity on a field in which highly erodible land is predominant or to have
designated such a field as conservation use. to have produced an agricultural commodity on converted wetland, or to have converted a wetland, if:
(I)SCS has determined that:
(i) Highly erodible land is predominant in such field. or
(ii)AII or a portion of the field is converted wetland: and
(2)ASCS has determined that the person is or was the owner or
operator of the land. or entitled to share in the crops available
from the land. or in the proceeds thereof
7 C.F.R. § 12.4(e).
62 201 F.3d at 923.
63 Id.
6 Id. at 924-25.
65 Id at 921.
66 See United States v. Dierckman. 41 F.Supp.2d 870 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
67 See id.
62
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its implementing regulations did not violate substantive due process.18
Jerry appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting the same arguments as he did in the District
Court." The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff United
States.70 The court held that (1) the Swampbuster provisions of the FSA were a permissible exercise of the spending
power of Congress, (2) 7 C.F.R. 12.4(e) was a reasonable and valid interpretation of the underlying statute, (3) The ASCS
finding that Jerry was the operator of the wetland when it was converted was proper and supported by evidence, and (4)
the FSA and its implementing regulations did not violate substantive due process."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Traditionally, Congress has provided vast subsidies to private landowners to drain wetlands for agricultural use.
Large federal flood control and drainage projects in the early half of the 20th century further accelerated wetland
conversion, so that by the early 1980s some 60 percent of the original wetlands of the United States had been drained,
cleared or filled. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the adverse effects of wetland drainage were becoming more
apparent.74 In response to the detrimental effects of wetland conversion, in 1972 and 1977 Congress amended the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (commonly known as the Clean Water Act or "CWA",7 ) to maintain and restore the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nations waters. 6
Section 404 of the CWA contains the bulk of the Act's wetland protection provisions, which are enforced by the
Army Corps of Engineers. Section 404 of the CWA requires that an individual wishing to discharge fill material into the
"navigable waters of the United States" must first obtain a permit to do so. 8 The protection afforded by Section 404 turns
on the definition of "navigable waters" and "waters of the United States." 79 Courts have held that the waters defined by
the CWA must affect interstate commerce in order to invoke CWA protection. 0 In addition, the CWA contains certain
provisions specifically exempted from protection." Thus, the CWA did not apply to many intrastate wetland conversion
activities.82
Fears that the CWA was not adequately addressing the wetland depletion issue prompted Congress to pass the
FSA of 1985, and its amendment by the FACTA of 1996. In passing the FSA in 1985, Congress stated that the purpose
of the legislation was to discourage the draining and cultivation of wetland that is unsuitable for agricultural production in
its natural state."8 By conditioning payment of USDA benefits on preservation of wetlands, the FSA greatly expanded the
61 See id.
69 201 F.3d at 921.
70 Id. at 928.
n' Id.
72 See James T.B. Tripp and Daniel J. Dudek. The Swampbuster Provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985: Stronger Wetland Conservation if
Properly Implemented and Enforced, 16 Envt'I L. Rep. 10120 (May, 1986).
n See id.
7 See id. Effects of large-scale wetland conversion include reductions in fish and wildlife habitat. water quality degradation from sediment. nutrient.
and pesticide loadings of the soil, and the loss of natural flood storage capacity. See id.
7s Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 56 Stat. 884 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994)).
76 See Daryn McBeth, Wetlands Conservation and Federal Regulation: Analysis of the Food Security Act 's Swampbuster- Provisions as Amended
b the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 21 Harv. Envtl L. Rev. 201, 218 (1997).
See id.
n See id. 13 U.S.C. § 1344 (a) (1994).
See id.
so See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997). Note, however, that isolated waters with no connection to interstate commerce except
the occasional presence of migratory birds has been held to affect interstate commerce. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999). Such a tenuous reading of the Commerce Clause has been put in doubt by recent
decisions of the Supreme Court. Compare Wickard v. Filburn. 317 U.S. 11 (1942) with United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
1 Notably, the Act indicates that:
[Tihe discharge of dredged or fill material ... from normal farming. silviculture, and ranching activities such
as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the production of food. fiber, and forest products. or upland soil and water
conservation practices...is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under [section 4041. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (1994).
82 See McBeth, 21 Harv. Envtl L. Rev. at 2t9.
8 See id at 220.
See S. Rep. No. 99-145, at 303 (reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. I103, 1969).
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ability of the federal government to regulate intrastate wetlands or those exempted by the CWA.
A. Federal Regulations Based on Congress' Spending Power
Article 1, section 8, clause I of the United States Constitution states that "(t)he Congress shall have the power to
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
welfare of the United States."86 Since the early days of the United States, scholars have debated the scope of the federal
spending power." James Madison was believed the clause only encompassed spending for enumerated powers conferred
upon the legislature by the Constitution." Alexander Hamilton subscribed to the position that the spending power
conferred a power separate and distinct from the other enumerated powers listed in the constitution and granted the
Congress the power to tax and spend in order to promote the general welfare of the nation."
In 1936, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Butler,"o provided for the first time a clear definition of the
Congressional spending power.9' Butler involved a challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which
increased farmer's prices for their products by decreasing the amounts harvested by subsidizing farmers who produced
less.9 2 In Butler, the Court adopted Hamilton's view, finding that the power to spend was not unlimited, but that its
confines were found in the clause conferring the power, and not in the other enumerated powers of Congress. 3 Ironically,
after very broadly defining Congress' spending power, the Court held the act unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth
Amendment, reasoning that regulation of agriculture was not an enumerated power of Congress.94 By this reasoning, the
Court held that the effect of the act was to regulate agriculture, not to spend in its furtherance." The Butler court
established the principle that Congress' spending power is not limited to furthering enumerated powers, but rather that
Congress can spend for the general welfare of the nation."
The Court further expanded the scope of the spending power in 1937 by its decisions in Steward Machine Co. v:
Davis97 and Helvering v. Davis.9" Both cases involved constitutional challenges to the newly enacted Social Security
Act.99 In Steward, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the act, indicating that it would not hear any assertion that
Congress' spending powers under the act were beyond the bounds of spending for the general welfare.'o In Helvering, the
Court further held that the power to spend was limited only by promotion of the general welfare, not by furtherance of
enumerated powers, and that Congress itself can define the scope of the general welfare.'
This deference was further cemented by Berman v. Parker,o2 in which the Court concluded that when Congress
has spoken, "the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." This indicates that the "general
welfare" is defined by the very legislation passed by Congress.'" Likewise, in Buckley v. Valeo,'osthe Court further
83 See McBeth. 21 Harv. Envtl L. Rev. at 221.
86 U.S. Const. art. I. §8(1).
87 See Chester James Antieau & William J. Rich, Modern Constitutional Law vol. 3. § 44.20. 201 (2d ed., West 1997).
88 See id.
9 See id.
9 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
"' See Antieau & Rich. Modern Constitutional Law vol. 3 § 44.20 at 202.
92 See id. at 200.
9' See Ryan C. Squire. Effectuating Principles of Federalism: Reevaluating the Federal Spending Power as the Great Tenth Amendment Loophole,
25 Pepp. L. Rev. 869. 897 (1998).
94 See id. at 898.
' See id.
96 See id.
9' 301 U.S..548 (1937).
98 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
9 See Squire, 25 Pepp. L. Rev. at 900.
'oo See id.
101 See Helvering. 301 U.S. at 645 (-When money is spent to promote the general welfare: the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by
Congress. not the states."): Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495. 515 (1937) (:.[wlhether the present expenditure serves a public
purpose is a practical question for the lawmaking department. and it would require a plain case of departure from every public purpose.which could
reasonably be conceived to justify the intervention of a court.")
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
O3 Id at 32.
'0 See Squire. 25 Pepp. L. Rev. at 901-02.
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expanded Congress' spending power by upholding the Federal Election Campaign Act, which involved federal financing
of presidential primary and general election campaigns.o' The Court rejected claims that such financing was contrary to
the general welfare, finding that it is the duty of Congress to determine which expenditures further the public welfare,
even if the Court thinks such expenditures are unwise.'
Congress may also exercise the spending power in order to encourage states to adopt legislation or policies
favored by the federal government.' By granting funds only to states that adopt laws approved by Congress, the federal
government can use the spending power to greatly influence state policy in a myriad of areas such as social security, racial
desegregation, pollution, education, and highway construction.'09 In 1987, the court integrated its approach to conditional
grants of federal funds in the watershed case of South Dakota v. Dole."0 In Dole, the Court upheld the power of Congress
to withhold federal highway funds from states allowing purchase or possession of alcoholic beverages by persons under
the age of twenty-one."' In reaching this result, the Court articulated a four-part test to be used in determining if federal
spending limitations are constitutional." 2 To pass constitutional muster: (1) the spending at issue must be in furtherance
of the general welfare; (2) if Congress desires to condition the state's receipt of funding, it must do so "unambiguously,"
enabling states to make such a choice knowingly; (3) conditions placed on receipt of federal funds must be "sufficiently
related" to "the federal interest in particular national projects or programs;" and (4) there must be no other constitutional
clause providing an "independent bar to the conditional grant of funds."" 3
In Dole, South Dakota argued that section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment granted states complete control over
liquor regulation and thus constituted an "independent constitutional bar" to the conditioning of federal funds." 4 In
concluding that the Twenty-First Amendment is not an "independent bar," the Court interpreted Butler to hold that "the
constitutional limitations on Congress exercising its spending power are less exacting than those on its authority to
regulate directly.""' The Court reasoned that the "independent constitutional bar" portion of the test did not prohibit
indirect regulation by way of conditional granting of funds of areas Congress is not empowered to regulate directly."'
Likewise, the Court found that the Tenth Amendment is not an "independent bar" to conditioning of federal funds,
reasoning that states do not have to accept federal money, but if they do, they must accept any conditions on those
grants." 7
Justice O'Connor dissented in Dole, however, her dissent was not based on the "independent bar" prong of the
test, but rather her dissent focused on the "federal interest" prong of the test."' O'Connor argued that the lowered
drinking age condition was not "sufficiently related" to the subject of highway construction." Since the inception of the
four-part test of Dole, no conditions on spending have ever failed to pass this "sufficient relationship" test.120 The end
result of the expansion of spending power over the course of the 20th century is that under the power, Congress currently
enjoys sweeping authority to indirectly regulate many activities that it could not directly regulate under its enumerated
powers.'2 ' In reviewing the Court's post-1937 spending power jurisprudence, it appears unlikely that the Court is willing
to restrict Congress' spending power in the near future.12
'os 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
10 See Squire, 25 Pepp. L. Rev. at 902.
1o7 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90-91.
'" See Antieau & Rich, vol. 3 § 44.20 at 203.
1o9 See -id.
no 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
"' See Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure vol. I § 5.7. 525 (3d ed. 1999).
112 See id.
" Dole, 483 U.S. at 206-08.
" See Rotunda & Nowak, vol.1 §5.7 at 527.
us See id
116 See id. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 212 ("Even if Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly. we conclude that
encouragement to state action found in Ithe federal law] is a valid use of the spending power.-).
" See id. at 526. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790 (-Requiring States to honor the obligations assumed as a condition of federal funding
before recognizing their ownership of funds simply does not intrude on their sovereignty.").
1'1 See Antieau & Rich, vol. 3 § 44.20 at 204.
"19 See id.
'o See id
121 See Squire, 25 Pepp. L. Rev. at 87 1.
122 See id.
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B. Review ofAdministrative Regulations
Typically, agency regulations promulgated in accordance with informal rulemaking procedures are reviewed
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and may only be set aside if the regulations are "arbitrary, capricious, a
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."l 2 3 Prior to 1984, courts charged with determining whether
an agency regulation was a reasonable construction of the underlying statute produced a very unpredictable corpus of
decisions.124 Two distinct lines of cases developed.'12 In the first, a court had to defer to an agency's construction of a
statute if it had a "reasonable basis in law.""'2 In the second line of cases, the court simply substituted the agency's
construction of the statute for its own interpretation.12  However, in 1984, in the watershed case of Chevron US.A., Inc.,
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 2 the Supreme Court adopted a two-step test to determine whether a court is to
give deference to an agency's regulation. Under Chevron, the reviewing court must first determine whether Congress has
spoken directly to the question at issue.'12 If so, the court must apply the intent of Congress.'30 If the court determines
that Congress has not spoken directly the question at issue and the statute is ambiguous, then the court must proceed to the
second step of the analysis to determine whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable.'
C. Review of Findings of Fact in Agency Adjudications
Judicial review of findings of fact in agency adjudications is generally governed by one of two standards under
the APA; the substantial evidence test or the arbitrary and capricious test.132 In formal adjudications governed by sections
556 and 557 of the APA, the proper standard to be applied is that an agency's findings of fact will be set aside if they are
unsupported by substantial evidence.'33 This standard is a very deferential standard of review, however, it arguably
remains less deferential than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, which applies to informal adjudications under the
APA." Under substantial evidence standard, an agency's findings of fact will be set aside only if "arbitrary, capricious,
or otherwise not in accordance with law."' 35 The original permutation of this standard was extraordinarily deferential to
agencies.36 However, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,"' the Supreme Court tempered slightly this highly
deferential standard by requiring "searching and careful inquiry" into the facts that support an agency decision.'
However, even with the less deferential tone of Volpe, the arbitrary and capricious standard remains a very deferential
standard of review of agency findings of fact.'39
23 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
24 See Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce. Jr., Administrative Law Treatise vol. I § 3.1, 107 (3d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1994).
29 See id. at 108.
26 See id. (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publications. 322 U.S. 111. 131 (1944). See also Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 413 (1982)
(agency's construction must be affirmed unless it is "arbitrary or contrary to law"); INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981) (agencies have authority
to adopt a narrow construction of a statutory term *should they deem it wise to do so-).
',See id. at 109. See also NLRB v: Bell Aerospace. 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (court imposes its own definitions of "employees" for federal labor.
relations purposes).
28 467 U.S. 837. 842-43 (1984).
29 Id. at 842.
Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 843-44.
32 See Davis and Pierce. Administrative Law Treatise. § 11.2 at 174.
3 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1999).
134 See Davis and Pierce. Administrative Law Treatise, § 11.4 at 200. Compare Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 745 F.2d 677. 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[In their application to the requirement of factual support the.
substantial-evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test are one and the.same. The.former is only a specific application of the latter, separately
recited by the APA not to establish a more rigorous standard of factual support. but to emphasize that in the case of formal proceedings the factual
support must be found in the closed record as opposed to elsewhere.").
"5 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1999).
136 See id: See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176. 186 (1935) ("[If any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain [the order], there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts. and one who assails [that presumption] must carry the burden of
showing that the action is arbitrary-).
'" 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
"" Id. at 416.
1
3 ) See Davis and Pierce. Administrative Lai Treatise. § 11.4 at 202. See Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner. 387 U.S. 136. 143 (1967) (substantial
evidence test provided a 'considerably more generous judicial review than the 'arbitrary and capricious' test-).
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D. Substantive Due Process
The doctrine of substantive due process found its genesis in the late 1800s amidst a political and social climate in
which scholars and judges increasingly believed in an unregulated laissez-faire economy based on principles of Social
Darwinism.140 Support for a laissez-faire philosophy reflected industry's growing hostility toward progressive legislation
aimed at protecting workers, unions, and consumers, and was primarily based on the belief that government regulations
interfered with the natural rights of people to own and use their property and contract freely."' As early as 1877, the
Supreme Court indicated that under some circumstances, government regulation of business would violate due process."
The doctrine of substantive due process reached its zenith with the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New
York,'43 in which the court declared a New York law that set the maximum number of hours a baker could work
unconstitutional.1' The court's decision in Lochner introduced three themes which were to become the pillar for the
court's substantive due process jurisprudence for the first third of the 20th century: Freedom of contract was a right
protected by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments; the government could interfere with
freedom of contract only to serve a valid police purpose; and the judiciary would carefully scrutinize legislation to ensure
that it served such a valid police purpose.'45 Under the ruling in Lochner, the court struck down many laws as violating
substantive due process over the course of the next three decades.'
By the mid-1930s, with the nation in the midst of the Great Depression, pressure was mounting for the court to
abandon its laissez-faire ideology of the Lochner era.'17 In the early 1930s, the court showed signs of departing from
Lochner era substantive due process ideology.'48 The true demise of Lochner came in 1937 and 1938 with the court's
decisions in West Coast Hotel v. Parrishl 49 and United States v. Carolene Products Co.' In West Coast Hotel, the court
declared that it would no longer protect freedom of contract as a fundamental right, that government could regulate to
serve any legitimate purpose, and that the judiciary would defer to legislative choices as long as they were reasonable.''
In Carolene Products, the court found that economic regulations should be upheld as long as they are supported by a
rational basis and that the court should defer to the government and uphold laws that are reasonable so long as they did
not interfere with fundamental rights or discriminate against 'discrete and insular minorities'.'" In essence, the Carolene
Products holding created a presumption of constitutionality for economic regulation as long as it does not interfere with
individual rights or discriminate against a distinct minority. 3
Since 1937, court decisions have made it very clear that economic regulations will be upheld when challenged
under the due process clause so long as they are rationally related to serve a legitimate purpose.' Decisions have
emphasized that it is the role of the legislature to determine whether economic regulations are wise or prudent."5 The end
140 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. § 8.2.1, 477 (Aspen Law & Business 1997).
141 Se id.
142 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877) ([T]he central question is whether "private property is affected with a public interest. [because]
when one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he. in effect. grants to the public an interest in that use. and.must submit to
be controlled by the public for the common good.").
'4 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
" Id.
1s See Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. § 8.2.2 at 482.
14 See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I (1915) (striking down law protecting unionizing): Adkins v. Children's Hospital. 261 U.S. 525 (1923)
(striking down minimum wage law for women); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (striking down consumer protection law setting
maximum price for gasoline).
14 See Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. § 8.2.3 at 487. Much of this pressure came from a more widely accepted view
that positive government intervention was necessary to economic survival and also the growing belief that the characterization of property rights and
freedom of contract as -natural liberties" was simply subterfuge to a political choice made by the court to favor employers over employees. See id.
148 See Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (-[Nleither property rights nor contract rights are absolute: for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm-).
4 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
"0 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
15' See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 391 (1937) ([Rlegulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process").
1s2 304 U.S. at 152-53 n. 4.
1 See Chemerinsky. Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. § 8.2.3 at 490.
1s See id
'5 See Ferguson v. Skrupa. 372 U.S. 726. 729 (1963) ([Ilt is up to legislatures. not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.-)
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result of the evolution of the court's substantive due process jurisprudence is that substantive due process is simply
unavailable as a challenge to economic regulations."'
E. Constitutional Dimensions of Wetlands Regulation and Swambuster Jurisprudence
In recent years, the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to affirmatively limit Congress' power to regulate
under the commerce power.' While none of the cases where the court has affixed limits on Congress' ability to regulate
under the commerce clause have involved a challenge to environmental regulation, there is no reason to believe that
environmental regulations based on the commerce clause are exempt from this shift in commerce power jurisprudence."'
Indeed, late in the 1999 term, the Court agreed to hear Solid Waste Agency ofNorthern Cook County v. US. Army Corps
of Engineers, ' involving a challenge to the EPA's migratory bird rule, a commerce power based rule which prohibits
destruction of wetlands, including intrastate wetlands, that are likely to be or actually are frequented by migratory birds.'o
This rule has generated a great deal of controversy as an impediment to development of private property with no apparent
or direct effect on interstate commerce.' In light of the recent commerce clause jurisprudence, it ispassible that this rule
may not pass constitutional muster.'62 It has been intimated that if this rulis ivalidated,,CaongTess' spending power may
present an alternative basis. far neguatism of itrastatL weellnds, ahotugh no, countlitas yet issued such a pronouncement.
Judicial treatmentofSwampribuster isscant.. Areviewofthe!existing Swampbusterjurisprudence reveals that no
plaintiff has yet arged that Swanpiuster is based on the commerce, clause peer, thus insellatihg wetlands with no
connection to interstate commerce from its, reach.. Some challengestto Swampbuster concern appeals of agency findings
of fact,' or the agency's decisiimns themselves as ashitnay and capricious.' Other challenges concern procedural due
process.' Some plaintiffs have argued that an agency's interpretation of the Swampbuster provision is incorrect or
unreasonable.' However, it appears that no plaintiff has challenged the Swampbuster provisions by alleging that they
were based on the commerce power. Thus, until Dierckman, no court had the opportunity to use Congress' spending
power as an alternative basis for regulation of intrastate wetlands.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In United States T: DierArnasz the Court of Appeals for the Sevenh Circuit held that (t) the Swampbuster
proVrisionas of the FSA are a permissible exercise of the spending poweref Congress, (2)7 C.ER. I24(e)) is a reasonable
and valid interpretation of the rnderflying statute, (3) the ASCS finding tiatf eary was the operatrf ofthe wetland when it
was converted was pioper and supported by evidence, and (4)) the FSA and its imprernenting regulations do no ie v bliate
substantive due process.-
In reaching this hol'ding, the court first turned to Jerry's argument that the wetrand in question cannot be regulated
' See Chemerinsky. Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. § 8.2.3 at 494.
'5 See infra note 197.
58 See Michael J. Gerhardt. Federal Environmental Regulation in a Post-Lope: World: Some Questions and Answers.
30 Envti. L. Rep. 10980 (2000).
15 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999). cert. granted. 120 S.Ct. 2003 (2000).




'6 See Prokop v. United States. 91 F.Supp2d 1301 (D. Neb. 2000) (Agency finding that land was "farmed wetland pasture" was not arbitrary and
capricious).
65 See Von Eye v. United States. 92 F.3d 681 (8thCir. 1996) (Agency determination that previous drainage of wetlands fell within exception to
Swampbuster. but that further drainage would constitute a violation not 'Arbitrary and Capricious').
16 See Downer v. United States. 97 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1996) (Notice and hearing given after violation discovered sufficient due process); Prokop v.
United States. 91 F.Supp2d 1301 (D. Neb. 2000) (Where farmer failed to summarize witnesses' expected testimony, exclusion of those witnesses at
trial was not denial of due process).
167 See Barthel v. USDA. 181 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 1999) (Agency interpretation that pre-Swampbuster exempted land could not be altered at all %4'as
incorrect).
168 United States v. Dierckman. 201 F.3d 915, 928 (7thCir. 2000).
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by the FSA.169 The main thrust of Jerry's argument concerns an analogy to the CWA.'o which prohibits discharging
pollutants into the "waters of the United States.""' Jerry argued that the "wetlands" regulated by the FSA are a subset of
those regulated by the CWA and that regulation of a strictly intrastate wetland is only permissible upon agency
determination that the wetland bears some relationship to interstate commerce.7 2 Thus, Jerry argued, because the wetland
on his farm is within the boundaries of a state, and it has not been determined to bear any relation to interstate commerce,
federal agency regulation is precluded.'
The court first noted that the "waters of the United States" language in the CWA was not parallel to the language
in the FSA.'74 The court then pointed out that Jerry's argument overlooked the difference between Congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause and under the spending power, in that the FSA derives its powers from the.
Congressional spending power, which does not require a connection to interstate commerce.' Critical to this
determination was the court's finding that the FSA was not a direct regulation, but instead conditions receipt of USDA
farm benefits on the preservation of wetlands, which the court found a proper exercise of Congress' spending power.'16
Relying on the broad grant of Congressional spending powers enunciated in South Dakota v. Dole, ' the court further
supported the proposition that intrastate wetlands are subject to regulation by the FSA.
The court further stated that Congressional intent to regulate intrastate wetlands is clear on the face of the FSA,
because that the act defines both "wetlands" and "converted wetlands" without reference to interstate commerce or any
correlation to the CWA.'n Therefore, the court concluded that the Swampbuster provisions of the FSA are a valid
exercise of the spending power of Congress and can reach intrastate wetlands with no connection to interstate
commerce. 79
The court next turned to Jerry's argument that the ineligibility determination was incorrect because the USDA
regulation mandating his ineligibility, 7 C.F.R. § 12.4(e),'s was inconsistent with the FSA and therefore void.'"' Jerry's
principal assertion was that the plain language of Swampbuster prohibits extension of liability to a farm "operator" who
played no role in wetlands conversion. He contended that an "operator" of the land should not be charged with the actions
of the owner and that the person who physically brings about the conversion should be liable under the FSA.' 2
The court first established that the proper standard of review of USDA regulations is under the APA and that the
agency action may be set aside only if "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' The court found that because Congress explicitly authorized the USDA to promulgate regulations on ineligibility
of benefits, the court must review the USDA regulations within the framework established by the Supreme Court in
Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council'"to determine if the agency interpretation found at 7 C.F.R. §
12.4(e)' 5 is permissible.8 6
Jerry argued that the plain meaning of the phrase, "any person who converts a wetland" indicated that only the
person who physically converts the wetland is ineligible for USDA benefits.' The court found that this could be a
'69 Id. at 922.
"o 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).






"' 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) ("[ojbjectives not thought to be within Article I's enumerated legislative fields." [Iike the Commerce Clause.l may
nevertheless be attained through use of the spending power and the conditional grant-of federal funds.')
na 201 F.3d at 922. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801(a)(4). (a)(16) (1994).
Id. at 928.
's See supra note 5 1.
'' Id. at 923.
1s2 id.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (a) (1994).
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
185 See supra note 5 1.
86 201 F.3d 915. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers. 191 F.3d 845. 851 (7th Cir. 1999) (11If
the plain meaning of the text of the statute either supports or opposes the regulation. the inquiry ends and the plain meaning is applied. but if the
statute is vague or ambiguous. the court must defer to the agency interpretation so long as it is based on a reasonable reading of the statute.").
Id. at 920.
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plausible reading of the statute, but that the phrase itself was ambiguous.'" The court then turned to the agency'sdefinition of the statute in 7 C.F.R § 21.4(e) (2) that "any person who converts a wetland" to include the "owner or
operator" of the land and found the definition to be a broad but reasonable reading of the statute.189 In response to Jerry's
argument that an operator should not be charged with the actions of the owner, as the owner has 'ultimate' control overthe land, the court found that the agency regulations that define an operator as someone who "must be in general control
of the farming operations on the farm" to be a reasonable reading of the statute under Chevron.'90 Thus, the court deducedthat it was not unreasonable to hold such a person responsible for wetlands conversion, because the operator must have atleast acquiesced in the conversion.'9 ' Therefore, the court held that the ineligibility regulations in 7 C.F.R. § 12.4(e) are a
reasonable interpretation of the FSA and support imposing USDA ineligibility upon operators of farmland who convert
wetlands.192
The court next addressed Jerry's argument that the ineligibility determination by the agency was not supported by
evidence.9 3 Jerry argued that he was the operator of the cropland only, and that his father Milton was the true operator ofthe wetlands in question.194 The court again turned to the APA, finding that an agency's decision may only be set aside ifit was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'95 The court then reviewedthe administrative record before the National Appeals Division of the ASCS and found that Jerry had indicated in hisfilings to the ASCS that he was the "operator" of the farm, and that there were other options, such as reconstitution of thefarm, that Jerry could have pursued in order to avoid the determination of ineligibility.'96 The court also rejected Jerry's
argument that he had no control over the actions of his father, indicating that he had produced little or no evidence that hetried to stop the conversion.'97 Therefore, the court concluded that it was not arbitrary or capricious for the ASCS to findthat Jerry was indeed the operator of the farm at the time of conversion.'"
Lastly, the court addressed Jerry's argument that the FSA and its implementing regulations violated substantivedue process.' 99 Jerry claimed that it was irrational to attempt to deter the conversion of wetlands through an ineligibility
sanction imposed on an operator of a farm, as the owner of the land would not be deterred by the loss of USDA benefitsfor an operator. 200 The court found that sanctioning both owners and operators would further the purpose ofSwampbuster, as both the owner and operator of the land share control over the land and both could potentially benefitfrom USDA subsidies.20 ' The court cited Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,202 which stands for the*
proposition that legislative enactments adjusting economic benefits and burdens enjoy a presumption of constitutionality
and that the complaining party must show that the legislature has acted arbitrarily and irrationally.203 Therefore, the court
concluded that the FSA and its implementing regulations did not violate substantive due process.204
V. COMMENT
The significance of the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Dierckman lies in the court's
characterization of the FSA as a valid exercise of the spending power of Congress. This characterization allows the
federal government to indirectly regulate vast amounts of privately owned wetlands that may lie wholly within the borders








'9 Id. at 925-26.






202 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
203 Id. at 729.
20 201 F.3d at 927.
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important objective, coercive programs such as Swampbuster indirectly regulate the use of private property even if that
property could not be regulated directly by the federal government. Faced with possible loss of all USDA benefits,
agricultural producers are faced with a "choice" in which they have no other option but to submit to coercive government
regulation of their property via Swampbuster. In addition to their coercive nature, the Swampbuster provisions exceed the
power of Congress to spend for the general welfare.
Swampbuster is considered a "voluntary" program because there are no civil or criminal penalties imposed for
violations of the act.205 Rather, Swampbuster seeks to protect wetlands by requiring farmers to conserve wetlands on their
property in order to qualify for USDA farm benefits.206 However, in light of the fact that by the time of the passage of the
FSA 1985, over 90 percent of American agricultural producers relied on such benefits, the program appears much less
"voluntary."207 Analogous to the "voluntary" nature of Swampbuster was the conditional grant of highway funding at
issue in Dole. In Dole, the Supreme Court emphasized that states were free to accept federal funds with attached
conditions, or decline them, thereby not accepting "federal coercion."208 However, the fact remains that faced with the
loss of highway funds, the state of South Dakota had no real "choice" but to accept any conditions attached, even if such
conditions would effect a regulation Congress is not ordinarily empowered to achieve. Similarly, farmers are forced to
choose between two coercive alternatives, as they can opt to not use wetlands on their property for agricultural use,
thereby retaining their USDA benefits, or convert such wetlands and hope their increased yields will offset the loss of
benefits. It is clear that with such a large number of agricultural producers receiving such benefits, this "choice" is little
more than "coercion."
The Supreme Court addressed similar coercive legislation in New York v- United States,20 9 where the court struck
down a provision of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985 ("LLRWPA") as an improper
usurpation of state authority by commandeering the states to legislate according to the will of Congress.:o At issue in Newl,
York was a federal regulation that mandated that states that did not meet Congress' specifications for disposal of such
waste within their borders would be liable for any damages resulting from failure to take possession of waste within its
borders.21' In invalidating the law, the court found that the principal issue was the extent to which states were able to
accept or reject the demands of Congress, and that the law provided states with "no choice at all" between regulating in
accordance with Congress' demands or allowing Congress to pre-empt the field, thus presenting two coercive choices.
212
In a similar fashion, the Swampbuster provisions force upon individual farmers a choice between two equally
coercive alternatives: farmers must either submit to federal regulation of their property or lose USDA benefits. The fact
that the vast majority of farmers in America are dependent in some form on such benefits ensures that no real "choice"
remains but for farmers to simply acquiesce to indirect federal regulation of their property. The current interpretation of
the spending power allows Congress almost unfettered power to coerce state and local governments to act in accordance
with federal designs, even if such coercion would be unavailable under an enumerated power.0 In Diercknan, the
Seventh Circuit's casting of the Swampbuster provisions of the FSA as a valid exercise of the spending power effectively
legitimates a similar coercive power over individual farmers' control over private property that Congress could not
regulate under any.enumerated power. By casting this regulatory scheme as an exercise of the spending power, the
Seventh Circuit, under current spending power jurisprudence, in effect assures that this coercive power is practically
unassailable on constitutional grounds.
In addition to being unduly coercive, the spending power, as exercised by the FSA, exceeds its constitutional
boundaries. Even Alexander Hamilton, the great proponent of federal power, indicated that the power to appropriate
205 See H.R. Rep. No. 99-271, at 203, 207 (1985), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1 103. 1969.
206 See Rebecca Fink, "We're From the Government and We're Here To Help. " Farmers' and Ranchers' Reliance on Voluntary Governmental
Programs May Open the Door To Governmental Control of Private Property Through the Expanding Scope of Wetlands Regulation. 30 Tex. Tech.
L. Rev. 1157, 1158 (1999).
207 See id.
208 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987).
2 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
210 See Squire, 25 Pepp. L. Rev. at 883.
211 See id.
212 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176-77 (1992).
213 See Squire, 25 Pepp. L. Rev. at 915-16.
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monies would not grant a power to do any other thing not expressly or impliedly authorized by the Constitution. 214
However, under current spending power jurisprudence, the Court effectively allows Congress to use the spending power
to achieve any desired ends.2 11
This treatment stands in stark contrast to the Court's recent decisions restricting Congressional regulation under
the Commerce Clause. " While the Court has indicated a willingness to affix limits to Congress' broad power to regulateinterstate commerce, it has also shown an unwillingness to curtail the vast power enjoyed by Congress under the spendingpower, allowing Congress to indirectly regulate a large number of activities it could not ordinarily regulate. Thus, while
the Court purports to restrict Congressional regulation of interstate commerce, it provides Congress the very means to
regulate the activities under the spending power that the Court would restrict under the Commerce Clause. These two
lines of cases are exceedingly difficult, if impossible to reconcile."' Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in Dole, indicates
that Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose conditions on a grant of federal monies beyond
specifying exactly how that money is to be spent, and that such a specification is not a condition at all, but a regulation,
valid only if it falls within one the enumerated powers of Congress.2 18
By characterizing the Swampbuster provisions of the FSA as based on Congress' spending power, the Seventh
Circuit in Dierckman validates exactly such an unconstitutional regulation. While there is little doubt that conservation of
wetlands is an important objective,219 it should not be achieved at the expense of federalism and the private property
interests of the American farmer by coercive, unconstitutional regulation. There are other methods for encouraging
environmentally responsible use of farmland other than the questionable methods of Swampbuster. The USDA has a
number of other programs that allow farmers to voluntarily provide for wetlands conservation while maintaining their
property rights in the land. These include the Wetlands Reserve Program ("WRP"),220 the Conservation Reserve Program("CRP") 22' and the Environmental Quality Incentives Program ("EQIP").222 These programs provide additional financial
benefits to landowners who voluntarily enter into agreements for wetlands preservation or grant either permanent or
limited negative easements specifying preservation of wetlands. 223 Rather than relying on unconstitutional and coercive
regulatory techniques, these programs emphasize cooperation between the USDA and agricultural producers.224 In
contrast, Swampbuster merely forces farmers to conserve wetlands by way of being a "financially manipulative sugar
daddy" instead of providing additional incentives to engage in environmentally sound agricultural practices.225
The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Dierckman greatly expands federal power to regulate wholly
intrastate wetlands. By holding that the Swampbuster provisions of the FSA are a valid exercise of Congress' spending
power, the court legitimated coercive and constitutionally questionable federal regulatory power over private property not
subject to direct federal regulation. Other Circuits should be loath to so characterize the Swampbuster provisions, as
214 See 3 Alexander Hamilton. Report on Manufacture, in Works 250 (Lodge ed., 1904) ("And there seems to be no room for a doubt that whatever
concerns the general interests of learning, of agriculture. of manufacturers, and of commerce, are within the sphere of national councils, as far as
regards application of money.. .A power to appropriate money with this latitude ... would not carry a power do any other thing not authorized in theConstitution. either expressly. or by fair implication.").
215 See Squire. 25 Pepp. L. Rev. at 912.
216 See Printz v. United States. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Striking down the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act on the basis that Congress lacked
authority to conscript local law enforcement to enforce a federal regulatory scheme); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Striking down theGun-Free School Zones Act on the basis that the law's relation to interstate commerce was too attenuated). For a detailed treatment of Lopez, see
Eric W. Hagen, United States v. Lope:: Artificial Respiration for the Tenth Amendment, 23 Pepp. L. Rev. 1363 (19%).21 This difficulty is further compounded when one considers that Chief Justice Rehnquist himself authored the opinions in both Dole and Lopez.
2's See Dole. 483 U.S. at 216 (O"Connor. J.. dissenting). Justice O'Connor indicated in Dole that the better understanding of the spending power, as
enunciated by the Court in Butler is that "[Tihere is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions upon which moneys shall be
expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be enforced." Id.(quoting United States v. Butler. 297 U.S. 1. 73 (1936)).
219 See generally Daryn McBeth, Wetlands Conservation and Federal Regulation: Analysis of the Food Security Act's "Swarpbuster" Provisions as
Amended by the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 21 Hary. Envtl. L. Rev. 201 (1997); James T.B. Tripp and Daniel J.
Dudek. The Swampbuster Provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985: Stronger Wetland Conservation of Properly Implemented and Enforced, 16
Envtil. L. Rep. 10120 (1986).
220 16 U.S.C. § 3837 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
221 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3836 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
222 16 U.S.C. § 3839(aa)-3839(aa)(8) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
223 See Fink. 30 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. at 1179.
224 See generally id. at 1178-96.
22s Fink. 30 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. at 1197.
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increasing federal regulatory power over intrastate wetlands, whether that power comes directly or indirectly, raises
serious issues concerning private land use and endorses a constitutionally questionable regulatory scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Dierckman, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Swampbuster provisions
of the Food Security Act were a valid exercise of Congress' spending power. While the decision by the Seventh Circuit is
not necessarily inconsistent with current spending power jurisprudence, it raises serious issues about the legitimacy of
Congress' ability to indirectly regulate wholly intrastate activities under the spending power. The Swampbuster
provisions of the FSA are coercive and constitutionally questionable as they effect an indirect regulation through the
spending power of activities Congress could not otherwise regulate. Whether other Circuits will adopt this reasoning is
uncertain. What is certain, however, is that by casting the Swampbuster provisions of the FSA as an exercise of the
spending power, the Seventh Circuit has legitimized vast indirect federal regulatory power over intrastate wetlands and, in
light of the current state of spending power jurisprudence, effectively insulated this power from challenge. What this
means for the American farmer is that until the Supreme Court's spending power jurisprudence changes, he will simply
have to comply with any directives issued by the USDA if he wishes to retain the benefits he so depends on.
PATRICK R. DOUGLAS
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